The recently proposed cybersecurity dynamics approach aims to understand cybersecurity from a holistic perspective by modeling the evolution of the global cybersecurity state. These models describe the interactions between the various kinds of cyber attacks and the various kinds of cyber defenses that take place in complex networks. In this paper, we study a particular kind of cybersecurity dynamics caused by the interactions between two classes of attacks (called push-based attacks and pull-based attacks) and two classes of defenses (called preventive and reactive defenses). The dynamics was previously shown to be globally stable in a special regime of the parameter universe of a model with node-independent and edge-independent parameters, but little is known beyond this regime. In this paper, we prove that the dynamics is globally stable in the entire parameter universe of a more general model with node-dependent and edge-dependent parameters. This means that the dynamics always converges to a unique equilibrium. We also prove that the dynamics converges exponentially to the equilibrium except for a particular parameter regime, in which the dynamics converges polynomially. Since it is often difficult to compute the equilibrium, we propose bounds of the equilibrium and numerically show that these bounds are tighter than those proposed in the literature.
INTRODUCTION
T HE importance of cybersecurity is now well recognized.
However, our understanding of cybersecurity from a holistic perspective (in contrast to a building-blocks perspective) is far from adequate. A deep understanding from a holistic perspective could help achieve quantifiable and predictable defense (e.g., by forcing or controlling the evolution of quantities of interest toward a destination that is beneficial to the defender [43] ). One approach to obtain such understanding is to model the interactions between the various kinds of cyber attacks and the various kinds of cyber defenses that take place in complex networks. Along this line of thinking, a particular approach, called cybersecurity dynamics [38] , has showed its potential for systematically understanding, characterizing, quantifying, and prescribing cybersecurity [6] , [10] , [20] , [23] , [36] , [37] , [39] , [41] , [42] , [43] , [44] , [47] . At a high level, this approach aims to characterize how the attack-defense interactions govern the evolution of the global cybersecurity state of a network [38] , [39] . The resulting characteristics are often stated in terms of some cybersecurity metrics (e.g., the percentage of the computers that are compromised), and can be applied to guide cyber defense operations via prescriptive means (e.g., [23] , [43] ).
The cybersecurity dynamics approach was inspired by multiple earlier endeavors in several disciplines [38] , including: (i) Biological Epidemic Models [2] , [3] , [11] , [16] , [24] as well as their adaptations to the cyber setting, namely Cyber Epidemic Models, which were pioneered by Kephart and White [14] , [15] and later elegantly developed to accommodate specific kinds of network structures (e.g., powerlaw [4] , [25] , [26] , [28] , [28] , [29] ) and arbitrary network structures (e.g., [5] , [9] , [27] , [33] , [34] ); (ii) Interacting Particle Systems [22] , which study the collective behaviors and phenomena that can be exhibited by interacting components; (iii) Microfoundation in Economics [13] , which aims to connect macroeconomic theories to the underlying microeconomic behaviors of agents. However, the cybersecurity dynamics approach has two telling features that distinguish it from these inspiring endeavors. First, it offers a systematic treatment of complex cyber attack-defense interactions, including preventive and reactive defense dynamics [6] , [20] , [37] , [42] , [44] , adaptive defense dynamics [43] , active defense dynamics [23] , [41] , [47] , and proactive defense dynamics [10] . Second, it articulates a systematic set of technical barriers that need to be addressed [38] .
In this paper, we investigate a particular kind of cybersecurity dynamics mentioned above, namely preventive and reactive defense dynamics. A full-fledged model of this dynamics was introduced in [21] and analytically treated in [42] . This model describes the interaction between two classes of attacks and two classes of defenses. The two classes of attacks are: push-based attacks, such as malwares that actively seek and attack vulnerable computers in cyberspace; pull-based attacks, such as drive-by downloads [30] by which vulnerable browsers and computers get compromised when visiting malicious websites. The two classes of defenses are: preventive defenses, including various intrusion prevention tools such as filtering, aim to prevent cyber attacks from succeeding; reactive defenses, such as anti-malware tools, aim to detect and clean the compromised computers.
An important research problem for understanding preventive and reactive defense dynamics (and cybersecurity dynamics in general) is: What phenomena would the dynamics exhibit? To be more specific, let us consider the metric of the percentage of compromised computers in a network at a point in time. As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the value of this metric evolves over the time horizon. A natural research question is: Does this percentage always evolve toward some equilibrium, or does it oscillate? Fig. 1a illustrates the case that the dynamics always converges to a unique equilibrium regardless of the initial value. In this case, the equilibrium percentage of compromised computers can be used, for example, to determine the degree of attacks that can be tolerated (e.g., using certain cryptosystems to tolerate the fraction of compromised computers [7] , [40] ). In contrast, Fig. 1b illustrates an "unmanageable" situation, where the percentage does not exhibit any pattern and can even be chaotic (meaning that the percentage is unpredictable because it is too sensitive to the initial value).
The state-of-the-art is that preventive and reactive defense dynamics described by a model considering arbitrary networks with node-independent and edge-independent parameters is globally stable in a special regime of the parameter universe, but little is known beyond this regime [42] . Fig. 2a illustrates the special parameter regime as the white-colored open area, where "open" means that the property of the dynamics in the parameter regime corresponding to the dashed boundary is not known. Moreover, the property of the dynamics in the parameter regime beyond the dashed boundary (i.e., the blue-colored area) is also not known.
Our contributions. In this paper, we make three contributions. First, we prove that preventive and reactive defense dynamics is globally stable in the entire parameter universe of a general model considering arbitrary networks and nodedependent and edge-dependent parameters (i.e., the nodes may have different attributes, and the edges or arcs may have different properties). This means that the dynamics always converges to a unique equilibrium regardless of the initial value, as illustrated in Fig. 1a .
In order to demonstrate how the new result has advanced the start-of-the-art, we note that there was no characterization on the dynamics in the general model mentioned above. Even for the special case of the general model considering arbitrary networks with node-independent and edge-independent parameters (i.e., the nodes have the same attribute, and the edges or arcs have the same attribute), the known result is illustrated in Fig. 2a as the white-colored area, which corresponds to the parameter regime "below" the epidemic threshold (i.e., the spreading will die out) [42] . However, little is known for the parameter regime "at" or "above" the epidemic threshold (i.e., the dashed boundary and the bluecolored area in Fig. 2a ).
Second, we prove that preventive and reactive defense dynamics of the general model mentioned above converges to the equilibrium exponentially except for a particular regime, in which the dynamics converges to the equilibrium polynomially. The particular regime corresponds to the dashed boundary in the illustration of Fig. 2a , namely the parameter regime "at" the epidemic threshold of the general model (considering arbitrary networks and node-dependent and edge-dependent parameters) with the extra restriction that there are no pull-based attacks (i.e., only the class of push-based attacks are in presence).
Putting the preceding two contributions together, we obtain a complete characterization of preventive and reactive defense dynamics of the general model considering arbitrary networks and node-dependent and edge-dependent parameters, including convergence speed.
Third, we give bounds on the equilibrium in the general model mentioned above. The defender can use the upper bound for decision-making, while noting that the price is possibly an overprovision of defense resources. By numerical simulation, we show that our bounds are tighter than the bounds presented in the literature (with compatible parameters).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the related prior work. In Section 3, we describe the continuous-time preventive and reactive defense dynamics model. In Section 4, we review some known results and present some intermediate results regarding the continuous-time model. In Section 5, we present our new results. In Section 6, we use numerical simulation to validate the new results. In Section 7, we discuss the limitations of the present study and future research directions. In Fig. 1 . The evolution of the percentage of compromised computers in a network (the y-axis) over time (the x-axis). (a) Global stability means that the dynamics always converges to a unique equilibrium regardless of the initial value. (b) An "unmanageable" situation. Fig. 2 . Illustration of results. (a) State-of-the-art: Preventive and reactive defense dynamics is known to be globally stable in a special parameter regime of a model considering arbitrary networks and node-independent and edge-independent parameters. This special parameter regime is marked as "known" and represented by the white-colored open area. Little is known about the other parameter regimes (including the dashed boundary), thus labeled as "unknown." (b) Our new result: Preventive and reactive defense dynamics is globally stable in the entire parameter universe of a general model considering arbitrary networks and nodedependent and edge-dependent parameters, and the convergence speed is completely characterized.
Section 8, we conclude the paper. We defer lengthy proofs to the Appendix.
RELATED WORK
The most closely related prior work is [42] , which gave a theoretical characterization of the preventive and reactive defense dynamics model introduced in [21] . This model considers the aforementioned two classes of attacks (i.e., push-based attacks and pull-based attacks) and the aforementioned two classes of defenses (i.e., preventive defenses and reactive defenses), arbitrary networks, but only nodeindependent and edge-independent parameters. As illustrated in Fig. 2a , the characterization presented in [42] only covers the special parameter regime "below" the epidemic threshold (i.e., the spreading will die out). On one hand, this model supersedes the model of preventive and reactive defenses against push-based attacks (i.e., there is no presence of pull-based attacks), which has been investigated in prior studies (e.g., [5] , [9] , [34] ). On the other hand, this model is superseded by the more general model in the present paper, which considers the same two classes of attacks and the same two classes of defenses, arbitrary networks, and node-dependent and edge-dependent parameters. Moreover, our new results cover the entire parameter universe of the more general model ("below", "at", and "above" the epidemic threshold). In parallel to preventive and reactive defense dynamics, other kinds of cybersecurity dynamics have been studied, such as adaptive defense dynamics [43] , active defense dynamics [23] , [41] , [47] , and proactive defense dynamics [10] . Deeply understanding these kinds of dynamics will pave the way for establishing a unified framework that accommodates all kinds of attacks and all kinds of defenses [38] , [39] .
We mentioned that the concept of cybersecurity dynamics was partly inspired by epidemics [2] , [3] , [11] , [16] , [24] . Research in epidemics has a rich history and literature, for which we refer to a recent survey [27] . Some epidemic models are related to the model we investigate. Specifically, [8] , [17] , [19] investigated the global stability of an epidemic model considering node-dependent and edge-dependent parameters. The model investigated in [8] , [17] , [19] was previously studied in a biological context [17] , [19] and later independently reinvented in the computer network context [32] , [33] . Special cases of this model considering nodeindependent and edge-independent parameters have been investigated in [1] , [17] , [18] , [19] .
As we will elaborate in Section 5.1.3, the model (thus, the dynamics) investigated in [8] , [17] , [19] is related to, but different from, the model (thus, the dynamics) we investigate, which was introduced in [21] . This is not surprising because both [32] , [33] and [21] were seemingly inspired by [34] . Since the model they analyze is different from the model we analyze, the results obtained in one model has no implications for the other. Nevertheless, it is still interesting to compare their results and ours in the sense of what may be called characteristic completeness: The results presented in [8] , [17] , [19] assume the networks are strongly connected or undirected (i.e., not arbitrary networks); in contrast, we consider arbitrary networks without making any restriction on their topological properties.
MODELING PREVENTIVE AND REACTIVE CYBER DEFENSE DYNAMICS
As in the discrete-time model [42] , we consider the interactions between push-based attacks and pull-based attacks against preventive defenses (e.g., intrusion prevention) and reactive defenses (e.g., anti-malware tools). Push-based attacks naturally formulate a cyber attack structure that can be modeled as a network G ¼ ðV; EÞ, where V ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; ng is the set of computers in the network, ðu; vÞ 2 E means that a compromised computer which we represent by node u can launch push-based attacks directly against a secure but vulnerable computer which we represent by node v, and G can be directed or undirected. (It is worth mentioning that the abstraction can be equally applied to a finer granularity; e.g., u represents a software component in a computer.) Note that G is not necessarily the underlying physical or communication network structure, except perhaps in scenarios such as sensor networks or email networks. In principle, G can be extracted from network security configurations. For example, some computers or IP addresses are prohibited from communicating with some other computers or IP addresses. This kind of access restriction is widely employed in the physical world for protecting sensitive facilities (e.g., only authorized users can have access to a military base), and is important for alleviating a cyber attack-defense asymmetry described in [41] , [47] . The extraction of G requires having access to the data describing enterprise networks and their security configurations, and is therefore an orthogonal research problem that needs to be investigated separately. Given that the kind of data is hard to obtain for academic researchers, characterization studies-including the present paper-should not make any restrictions on the structure of G. In other words, we should accommodate arbitrary network structures for G.
The adjacency matrix of cyber attack structure G is denoted by A ¼ ½a vu nÂn where a vu ¼ 1 if and only if ðu; vÞ 2 E. Because we focus on attacks launched by compromised computers against others, we naturally let a vv ¼ 0, which means that privilege escalation is not explicitly accommodated. Instead, a computer is always treated as compromised after it is penetrated and before it is cleaned up. Denote by degðvÞ the (in-)degree of node v in G, because G can be directed or undirected. Note that
In parallel to the discrete-time model investigated in [42] , we consider a continuous-time model. At any point in time t, a node v 2 V is in one of two states: secure (i.e., secure but vulnerable, denoted by "0") or compromised (denoted by "1"). Let s v ðtÞ and i v ðtÞ respectively denote the probability that node v is in the secure and compromised states at time t, where s v ðtÞ þ i v ðtÞ ¼ 1 for any v 2 V and any t ! 0. The global cybersecurity state probability vector is sðtÞ ¼ ½s 1 ðtÞ; . . . ; s n ðtÞ, or equivalently iðtÞ ¼ ½i 1 ðtÞ; . . . ; i n ðtÞ. Note that P v2V i v ðtÞ is the expected value of the number of compromised computers at time t. Fig. 3 illustrates the state-transition diagram of the continuous-time nonlinear Dynamical System model. Parameter b v for v 2 V describes the reactive defense power (i.e., effectiveness or capability), namely the probability that a compromised node becomes secure at any point in time because of the reactive defense. The probability that a secure node gets compromised, namely u v;0!1 ðtÞ, is dependent upon the power of pull-and push-based cyber attacks against the preventive defense in question. For modeling the power of pull-based cyber attacks against the preventive defense, we use parameter a v 2 ½0; 1 for v 2 V to denote the probability that a secure node becomes compromised at any time t despite the deployed preventive defense. For modeling the power of push-based cyber attacks against the preventive defense, we use parameter g vu 2 ð0; 1 for u; v 2 V to denote the probability that a compromised node u successfully attacks a secure node v, where ðu; vÞ 2 E. Assuming the compromised nodes launch attacks against their neighbors independent of each other, we have
This leads to the following continuous-time Dynamical System model for all
which can be rewritten as
The main research task is to analyze the system of n nonlinear equations given by (1) . Summary of notations. Let j R be the set of real numbers, j R þ be the set of nonnegative real numbers, and C be the set of complex numbers. For comparing two n-dimensional vectors i ¼ ½i 1 ; . . . ; i n 2 j R n and j ¼ ½j 1 ; . . . ; j n 2 j R n , we use the following notations:
. . . ; n, "i > j" means i ! j and i v > j v for some v 2 ½1; . . . ; n, and "i ) j" means that i v > j v for all v 2 ½1; . . . ; n. Table 1 summarizes the other major notations used in the paper.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review some background knowledge and previous results related to system (1) . We also introduce some lemmas regarding system (1). These lemmas will be used in deriving our new results in the next section.
Algebraic Graph Theory
A directed graph, such as a directed cyber attack structure G ¼ ðV; EÞ, is said to be strongly connected if there is a directed path from any node to any other node. A strongly connected component is a strongly connected subgraph that is not contained in any other strongly connected subgraph. The adjacent matrix A of graph G can be rearranged to the Frobenius form 
where the strongly connected component A jj is irreducible for j ¼ 1; . . . ; p À 1, and A pp is irreducible or is a zero matrix with dimension 1. For j ¼ 1; . . . ; p, we can define the subset V j V corresponding to the strongly connected component A jj as 
A the cyber attack structure G and its adja-
the largest real part of the eigenvalues of matrix M i v ðtÞ the probability v is compromised at time t a v ; a 2 ½0; 1 the probability a secure but vulnerable node v 2 V becomes compromised because of pull-based attacks. We do not mention the subscript v when a v is the same for all v 2 V (i.e., the homogeneous parameter
the probability a compromised node v 2 V becomes secure because of the reactive defense for node v. We do not mention the
g vu ; g 2 ð0; 1, G the probability a secure but vulnerable node v 2 V becomes compromised because of pushbased attacks launched from a compromised node u 2 N v . We do not mention the subscript vu when g vu is the same for all ðv; uÞ 2 E (i.e., the homogeneous parameter case of g ¼ g vu all ðv; uÞ 2 E). G ¼ ½g vu v;u2V .
Cooperative Dynamical Systems
Our analysis will take advantage of cooperative dynamical systems and subhomogeneous maps, which are reviewed below.
Definition 1 (cooperative dynamical system [12] ). Let is said to be cooperative if @f v ðxÞ=@x u ! 0 holds for all u; v 2 f1; . . . ; ng and u 6 ¼ v.
Definition 2 (subhomogeneity [46] ). Let fðÁÞ :
fðÁÞ is said to be subhomogeneous if fðdxÞ ! dfðxÞ for any x 2 D and d 2 ð0; 1Þ; fðÁÞ is said to be strictly subhomogeneous if fðdxÞ > dfðxÞ for any x 2 D with x ) j 0 and d 2 ð0; 1Þ; fðÁÞ is said to be strongly subhomogeneous if fðdxÞ ) dfðxÞ for any x 2 D with x ) j 0 and d 2 ð0; 1Þ.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1.7 in [12] ). If fðÁÞ is cooperative in If sðDfð j 0ÞÞ 0, then x Ã ¼ j 0 is globally asymptotically stable. If sðDfð j 0ÞÞ > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium x Ã 2 D n f j 0g that is globally asymptotically stable.
Previous Results Related to System (1)
In the special case of system (1) with node-independent and edge-independent parameters, especially a ¼ 0 (i.e., preventive and reactive defenses against push-based attacks only), it is known that the dynamics converges to equilibrium j 0 in the special regime of the parameter universe given by the following Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 ( [5] ). Let parameters G, a, b and g be specified as in the model described above. If
system (1) with node-independent and edge-independent parameters as well as a ¼ 0 is globally exponentially stable. This means that the dynamics converges to the equilibrium j 0 at an exponential speed regardless of the initial value ið0Þ ¼ ½i 1 ð0Þ; . . . ; i n ð0Þ.
In the more general case a ! 0 (i.e., preventive and reactive defenses against push-based and pull-based attacks), the following Theorem 6 supersedes the preceding Theorem 5, because condition (4) degenerates to condition (3).
Theorem 6 ( [42] ). Let parameters G, a, b and g be specified as
system (1) with node-independent and edge-independent parameters is globally exponentially stable. This means that the dynamics converges to some equilibrium i Ã ¼ ½i Ã 1 ; . . . ; i Ã n at an exponential speed regardless of the initial value ið0Þ ¼ ½i 1 ð0Þ; . . . ; i n ð0Þ.
Note that Theorems 5 and 6 only cover the parameter regime "below" the epidemic threshold in the preventive and reactive defense dynamics model considering arbitrary networks with node-independent and edge-independent parameters.
Two New Lemmas Regarding System (1)
The following Lemmas 1 and 2 are two basic results regarding system (1), and are applicable to both the case a v > 0 and the case a v ¼ 0. Denote by f v ðiÞ the right-hand side of system (1), namely
where v 2 V and iðtÞ ¼ ½i 1 ðtÞ; . . . ; i n ðtÞ 2 ½0; 1 n for all v 2 V . Note that f v ðiÞ is continuously differentiable in ½0; 1 n . Lemma 1 below shows that system (1) with a v ! 0 for v 2 is cooperative.
Proof. For any v 2 V and u 2 N v , we have
For u = 2 N v , Eq. (5) implies that @fvðiÞ @iu ¼ 0. It follows that @f v ðiÞ @i u ! 0;
for all u 6 ¼ v and u; v 2 V . According to Definition 1, system (1) is cooperative. t u Lemma 2 below shows that all trajectories of system (1) are always bounded within ½0; 1 n . Its proof is deferred to Appendix A Lemma 2. Let iðtÞ ¼ ½i 1 ðtÞ; . . . ; i n ðtÞ be the trajectory of system (1) .
É . In other words, i v ðtÞ 2 ½0; 1 À v when t ! þ1.
NEW RESULTS

Global Stability and Convergence Speed (Main Result)
Our main result, Theorem 7 below, says that preventive and reactive defense dynamics, or system (1), is globally stable in the entire parameter universe of arbitrary networks with node-dependent and edge-dependent parameters, and that the convergence speed depends on the parameter regime.
Theorem 7 (main theorem). Given model parameters G, a v , b v and g vu for any u; v 2 V as specified above, system (1) is globally stable, meaning that there is always a unique equilibrium i Ã 2 ½0; 1 n such that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (1) converges to i Ã . Moreover, the convergence speed depends on the parameter regime as follows:
(1) If a v ¼ 0 for all v 2 V and ÀBþG;1 < 0, the dynamics converges exponentially; (2) If a v ¼ 0 for all v 2 V and ÀBþG;1 ¼ 0, the dynamics converges polynomially; (3) If a v ¼ 0 for all v 2 V and ÀBþG;1 > 0, the dynamics converges exponentially except for a set of zero measure corresponding to ðb v ; g vu Þ v;u2V 2 ½0; 1 n 2 ; (4) If a v > 0 for all v 2 V , the dynamics converges exponentially except for a set of zero measure corresponding to ða v ; b v ; g vu Þ v;u2V 2 ½0; 1 n 2 þn .
The key insight for proving Theorem 7 is to take advantage of the properties of cooperative systems and subhomogeneous maps reviewed above. The proof of Theorem 7 will need the following Lemmas 3 and 4, whose proofs are respectively deferred to Appendices C and D. The proof of Theorem 7 is therefore deferred to Appendix D.
Lemma for the Case a v > 0
Recall that Lemma 2 shows that when a v > 0 for all v 2 V , the trajectory iðtÞ of system (1) will eventually enter an
where v k > 0 for k ¼ 1; . . . ; n. This means that the close subset D is an attraction domain which contains at least one equilibrium.
Lemma 3 further shows that system (1) is globally stable when a v > 0 for all v 2 V , meaning that there exists a unique equilibrium component i Ã v 2 ½0; 1 such that the equi-
This means there is only one equilibrium in the close attraction domain D . Moreover, the convergence speed is exponential except for a zero-measure set of some ða v ; b v ; g vu Þ's. The exclusion of this zero-measure set is necessarily for mathematical rigor, but has no practical impact because the probability that these ða v ; b v ; g vu Þ's can be sampled is zero.
Lemma 3 (Global stability and convergence speed in the case of a v > 0 for all v 2 V ). Given model parameters G, a v , b v and g vu for u; v 2 V as specified above. If a v > 0 for all v 2 V , then the preventive and reactive defense dynamics is globally stable, meaning that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (1) always converges to a unique equilibrium i Ã ¼ ½i Ã 1 ; . . . ; i Ã n 2 ð0; 1Þ n . Moreover, the convergence is exponential for except for a set of zero measure corresponding to ða v ; b v ; g vu Þ 2 ½0; 1 n 2 þn for u; v 2 V .
Note that the exclusion of the set of zero measure in Lemma 3 is for mathematical rigor and has no practical side-effect.
Lemma for the Case a v ¼ 0
The following Lemma 4 says that system (1) is globally stable when a v ¼ 0 for all v 2 V . (1) If GÀB;1 0, it holds that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (1) converges to j 0. When GÀB;1 < 0, the convergence speed of the trajectory iðtÞ is exponential; when GÀB;1 ¼ 0, the convergence speed of the trajectory iðtÞ is polynomial.
(2) If GÀB;1 > 0, then there exists a unique equilibrium i Ã ¼ ½i Ã 1 ; . . . ; i Ã n 2 ½0; 1 n nf j 0; 1g such that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (1) converges to i Ã . Moreover, the convergence speed of the trajectory iðtÞ is exponential except for a set of zero measure corresponding to
Note also that the exclusion of the set of zero measure in Lemma 4 is for mathematical rigor and has no practical side-effect.
On the Novelty of Our Results
As indicated in the Related Work section, [8] , [17] , [19] have studied the global stability of the following dynamical system model (after translating into our notations)
It is clear that system (6) is different from system (1), not only because system (6) does not have a counterpart of the parameter a v in system (1), but also because system (6) contains a component P u2N v while system (1) containing a component Q u2N v . This means that any (global stability) results obtained for system (6) have no implications for system (1) , and vice versa. This justifies the novelty of our results.
Nevertheless, it is still interesting to compare their results and ours in the following sense of characteristic completeness. Specifically, the results reported in [8] , [17] , [19] do not cover the entire parameter universe of system (6) . On one hand, [8] , [19] proved that system (6) is globally stable by assuming that the adjacency matrix A is irreducible, namely that the network G is strongly connected. However, arbitrary networks do not have to be strongly connected. On the other hand, [17] assumed that G is undirected network. However, arbitrary networks do not have to be undirected. Moreover, [17] did not address the parameter regime "at" the epidemic threshold. The implication is that the dynamics of Eq. (6) has yet to be characterized in the entire parameter universe with truly arbitrary networks.
In contrast, Theorem 7 deals with system (1) with truly arbitrary networks (strongly connected or not, and directed or not) in the entire parameter universe of node-dependent and edge-dependent parameters, namely the parameter regimes "below", "at", and "above" the epidemic threshold. That is, the dynamics of system (1) is now completely characterized, including the convergence speed.
Global Stability and Convergence Speed in the Case of Node-Independent and Edge-Independent Parameters a; b; g
The global stability established by Theorem 7 regards nodedependent parameters a v and b v for v 2 V and edge-dependent parameters g vu for ðu; vÞ 2 E. For node-independent parameters a and b and edge-independent parameters g, system (1) becomes the following system (7) di
The global stability of system (7) is established by the following Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 of Theorem 7.
Corollary 1. Consider system (1) with arbitrary network G, node-independent parameters a and b, and edge-independent parameter g. If a > 0, the dynamics of system (7) dynamics is globally stable, meaning that there exists a unique equilibrium i Ã ¼ ½i Ã 1 ; . . . ; i Ã n 2 ð0; 1Þ n such that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (7) always converges to i Ã . Moreover, the convergence is exponential for except for some zero-measure set of ða; b; gÞ 2 ½0; 1 3 . Corollary 2. Consider system (1) with arbitrary network G, node-independent parameters a ¼ 0 and b, and edge-independent parameter g.
(1) In the case A;1 b g , the dynamics of system (7) is globally stable. Moreover, every trajectory iðtÞ of system (7) converges to j 0. When A;1 < b g , the convergence speed is exponential (as what has been proven in [5] , [42] ); when A;1 ¼ b g , the convergence speed is polynomial.
(2) In the case A;1 > b g , then there exists a unique equilibrium i Ã ¼ ½i Ã 1 ; . . . ; i Ã n 2 ½0; 1 n nf j 0; 1g such that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (7) converges to i Ã . Moreover, the convergence is exponential except for a zero-measure set of ðb; gÞ 2 ½0; 1 2 .
It is worth mentioning that Corollary 2 has a nice sideproduct. In [5] , it was claimed that condition (3), namely A;1 < b g , is necessary and sufficient for the dynamics with a ¼ 0 to converge to equilibrium j 0. In [42] , it was shown that condition (3) is sufficient, but not necessary. The evidence given in [42] is a counter-example, but not an explanation why condition (3) is not necessary. Corollary 2 fills the void by showing that condition (3) is not necessary because the dynamics also converges to equilibrium j 0 at the epidemic threshold, namely when A;1 ¼ b g .
Bounding the Unique Equilibrium
Having proved the global stability of the dynamics in the entire parameter universe, namely the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium i Ã ¼ ½i Ã 1 ; . . . ; i Ã n , it would be ideal if we can get an analytic expression of i Ã from
for all u; v 2 V . This turns out to be a difficult problem, except for some special cases. For example, in the special (1) can be simplified as
The solution to this system of differential equations is
The unique equilibrium is i Ã ¼ ½ 1 2 ; . . . ; 1 2 n . As an alternative, we now aim to bound the equilibrium because the bounds can be useful (e.g., the upper bound can be used in cyber defense decision-making for accommodating the worst-case scenario). To simplify the presentation, let
and
fi v ðtÞg:
Now, we have the following theorem, whose proof is deferred to Appendix E. Theorem 8. Let iðtÞ ¼ ½i 1 ðtÞ; . . . ; i n ðtÞ be the solution to system (1), iðtÞ ¼ ½i 1 ðtÞ; . . . ; i n ðtÞ denote the upper bound of iðtÞ and iðtÞ ¼ ½i 1 ðtÞ; . . . ; i n ðtÞ denote the lower bound of iðtÞ. Then we have
and for v 2 V and t 2 ½0; þ1Þ, where g v;max ¼ max u2N v fg vu g and
The numerical simulation reported in Section 6 shows that these bounds are tighter than the bounds presented in [42] . The tightness comes from (i) knowing the global stability of the dynamics allows us to identify i min and i max , which had to be respectively set to 0 and 1 in [42] because of the lack of information on the global stability, and (ii) we use the geometric average to make the bounds accommodate nodes' (in-)degree degðvÞ.
NUMERICAL SIMULATION
It would be ideal if we can use real data to validate the theoretical results. Unfortunately, we do not have access to such data, which is hard to obtain because of legal and privacy concerns. Instead, we use numerical examples to illustrate the results, namely the global stability of the dynamics, the relative tightness of the new upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium, and the convergence speed.
Numerical Simulation Method and Parameters
We use the well-known Euler method for the numerical simulation of dynamical system (1), by setting the iteration step as h ¼ 0:1.
The simulation focuses on our new results, namely the parameter regimes other than those that have been well understood according to [5] , [42] . Specifically, in the case a v ¼ 0 for all v 2 V , we focus on the parameter regimes with GÀB;1 ! 0, which violate the previously-known convergence condition (3) as discussed above; in the case a v > 0 for all v 2 V , we focus on the parameter regimes with ðHþgð1ÀaÞAÞ;1 ! 1, which violate the previouslyknown convergence condition (4) as discussed above. In the simulation, we set i v ð0Þ for v 2 V to be a number independently and randomly chosen from an arbitrarily chosen interval ½0; 1.
For G, we use the following network structures that are available from http://snap.stanford.edu/data/. These two networks can be used as examples of cyber attack structure G because attacks can indeed follow these topologies.
The Gnutella peer-to-peer network: a directed graph with n ¼ 8,114 nodes, jEj ¼ 26,013 links, maximal node in-degree 61 and A;1 ¼ 4:5361. For this network, we consider the following parameter combinations: meaning that hi v ðtÞi v2V should converge to a non-zero equilibrium.
Simulation Results
Confirmation of Global Stability and Relative Tightness of the Bounds
For the Facebook network structure, Fig. 4 plots the simulation result according to system (1), the new upper bound iðtÞ ¼ 1 n P v2V i v ðtÞ according to Eq. (11), the new lower bound iðtÞ ¼ 1 n P v2V i v ðtÞ according to Eq. (10), and the upper bound h as well as lower bound z given in [42] . For the Gnutella network structure, Fig. 5 plots the simulation result according to system (1), the new upper bound iðtÞ, the new lower bound iðtÞ, and the upper bound h and lower bound z given in [42] .
We observe that in each subfigure of Figs. 4 and 5, the average trajectory component hi v ðtÞi v ¼ 1 n P v2V i v ðtÞ becomes steady when t ! þ1. This confirms the global stability of the dynamics (1) in both undirected graph and directed graph. On the other hand, the new bounds are at least as tight as the previous bounds given in [42] , and the new bounds are substantially tighter in most cases. By comparing Figs. 4b and 5b , we observe that even the new bounds for a ¼ 0 with GÀB;1 > 0 can be very loose. This offers a great opportunity for future research: How can we characterize the circumstances under which the bounds are tight?
Confirmation of Convergence Speed
Theorems 3 and 4 showed that the convergence is polynomial in the case a ¼ 0 with GÀB;1 ¼ 0, and is exponential in all other cases. In order to confirm these results, we define the following indicator of convergence speed We choose this definition because lim t!þ1 SðtÞ ¼ 0 means the convergence speed is polynomial and lim t!þ1 SðtÞ ¼ s for some negative constant s means the convergence speed is exponential. For the Gnutella network structure, Fig. 6a plots the convergence speed given by Eq. (12) in the parameter combinations mentioned above. We observe that the convergence in case a ¼ 0 with GÀB;1 ¼ 0 steadily goes to 0, which confirms the polynomial convergence. For the other cases, the simulation result confirms that the convergence is exponential because Eq. (12) goes to a negative constant in these cases. Fig. 6b plots the convergence with respect to the Facebook network structure, which exhibits similar phenomena.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The present study has several limitations. First, we assumed that the cyber attack structure G and the model parameters a v and b v for v 2 V as well as g vu for ðu; vÞ 2 E are given. This assumption has been widely made in the literature (e.g., [27] , [42] and the extensive references therein), and calls for future investigations on how to obtain these parameters in realworld environments. This assumption is reasonable because obtaining these parameters is a research problem that is orthogonal to the present characterization study. It is worth mentioning that characterization studies can suggest practical methods for alleviating the reliance on the knowledge of model parameters. For example, the characterization study [42] led to a practical sampling method for estimating the equilibrium without knowing the values of parameters a, b and g. The sampling method only need the premise that the dynamics converges to a unique equilibrium, which is assured by the theoretic result that holds no matter we know the values of the parameters or not. We anticipate that more results will be developed along this direction in the future.
Second, we assumed G, a v , b v , and g vu are time-independent. These assumptions would be valid for a short period of time, namely when the dynamics converges exponentially. It is an important future work to investigate the dynamics while accommodating time-dependent parameters, namely GðtÞ, a v ðtÞ, b v ðtÞ and g vu ðtÞ.
Third, we assumed that the compromised nodes launch attacks independent of each other. This assumption is widely made in the literature (see [27] , [42] and the references therein). The first work that aimed at getting rid of this independence assumption (i.e., accommodating the dependence instead) is [36] , which opens the door to many open problems for future study.
CONCLUSION
We have showed that preventive and reactive defense dynamics is globally stable in the entire parameter universe of a general model considering arbitrary networks with node-dependent and edge-dependent parameters. Our characterization of the convergence speed has led to a complete understanding of the dynamics in the entire parameter universe. We have presented bounds of the equilibrium, and showed that these bounds are tighter than the ones given in the literature.
There are many open problems for future research, especially addressing the limitations articulated in Section 7.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. We prove this lemma for the case a v > 0, while noting that the case a v ¼ 0 can be proven similarly. When a v > 0, we prove that the interval ½ v ; 1 À v is positively invariant for some constant v 2 ð0; Ã v;1 Þ. For v 2 V , we have
Then, there exists a positive number v 2 ð0; This implies that if i v ð0Þ 2 ½ v ; 1 À v , then i v ðtÞ 2 ½ v ; 1 À v for all t 2 ½0; þ1Þ. This means that ½ v ; 1 À v is positively invariant.
Observe that if i v ðtÞ v , then we have
Hence, ½ v ; 1 À v is attracting and the trajectory component i v ðtÞ of system (1) will eventually enter domain
Proof. Let fðiÞ ¼ ½f 1 ðiÞ; . . . ; f n ðiÞ : ½0; 1 n ! ½0; 1 n be the continuous map where f v ðiÞ is defined in Eq. (5) for v 2 V . Consider the continuous map gðiÞ ¼ ½g 1 ðiÞ; . . . ; g n ðiÞ : ½0; 1 n ! ½1; 1 þ r n with g v ðiÞ ¼ 1 þ rf v ðiÞ and r > 0 being a constant. For any d 2 ð0; 1Þ, i 2 ½0; 1 n nf j 0g and a v > 0, we have
In what follows we are to prove the following inequality (13) when a v > 0:
for any v 2 V , by induction on (in-)degree degðvÞ. When
Suppose inequality (13) holds when degðvÞ
where w 6 ¼ u and u; w 2 N v . This means inequality (13) holds when degðvÞ ¼ d v þ 1. In other words, inequality (13) holds for every degðvÞ. This means g v ðdiÞ > dg v ðiÞ for any d 2 ð0; 1Þ and any v 2 V , namely gðdiÞ ) dgðiÞ for any d 2 ð0; 1Þ. According to Definition 2, gðiÞ is strongly subhomogeneous on ½0; 1 n . This means condition (b) required by Theorem 3 is satisfied. Since system (1) is cooperative according to Lemma 1, Theorem 1 says fðiÞ is monotone on ½0; 1 n , which implies gðiÞ is monotone on ½0; 1 n . This means condition (a) required by Theorem 3 is satisfied. Lemma 2 says iðtÞ will eventually enter the domain D ¼ ½ v 1 ; 1 À v 1 Â Á Á Á Â ½ v n ; 1 À v n , which is a nonempty compact invariant subset of ½0; 1 n . Hence, according to Theorem 3, gðÁÞ admits a nonempty compact invariant set D & ½0; 1 n and has a fixed point i Ã ) j 0 such that every nonempty compact invariant set of gðÁÞ in D consists of i Ã , that is to say, D contains a single equilibrium i Ã . Theorem 2 says that if the nonempty compact invariant subset D contains only one equilibrium i Ã , then every trajectory attracted to the closed domain D converges to i Ã . Therefore, we conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium i Ã 2 ½0; 1 n nf j 0; 1g such that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (1) always converges to i Ã . Now we prove that the convergence is exponential. We observe that the largest real part of all eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix Â @f v ðiÞ=@i u Ã u;v2V at equilibrium i ¼ i Ã should be non-positive (otherwise, i Ã is unstable). Let
where sðÁÞ stands for the set of eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix and <eðÁÞ stands for the real parts of the eigenvalues. Lemma 1 showed that system (1) is cooperative, meaning that all off-diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix are nonnegative and Gða v Þ is one of the eigenvalues. Since Gða v Þ is an analytic function with respect to a v , the solutions of
This means that the set W av of solutions of Gða v Þ ¼ 0 has a zero measure. If a v = 2 W av , then Gða v Þ < 0, meaning that the convergence towards i Ã is exponential. The same reasoning applies to b v and W b v as well as g v and W g vu . Putting these together, we conclude that the dynamics converges to i Ã exponentially except for a zero-measure set
0 is an equilibrium of system (1).
If GÀB;1 0, Lemma 1 says that system (1) with a v ¼ 0 is cooperative. Lemma 2 tells that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (1) with a v ¼ 0 will eventually enter the bounded domain ½0; 1 À v n for some constant v 2 ð0; Ã 2;v Þ where 0 < Ã 2;v 1 2 . The first result in Theorem 4 as well as its proof confirms that every trajectory iðtÞ of system (1) will converge to equilibrium j 0. Now we are to prove the convergence is polynomial when GÀB;1 0. We observe that all off-diagonal elements of the Jacobian matrix at equilibrium i ¼ i Ã are nonnegative. Without loss of generality, we suppose that the geometrical dimension of eigenvalue GÀB;1 is 1, because it is straightforward to deal with the case that the geometrical dimension is greater than 1. This means that the right eigenvector associated with GÀB;1 has all components nonnegative, which can be denoted by ¼ ½ 1 ; . . . ; n > with P n v¼1 v ¼ 1. Let jðtÞ ¼ iðtÞ À i Ã be the variation at i Ã , which exponentially converges to zero in the direction of . Consider jðtÞ ¼ hðtÞ for some scalar function hðtÞ. From the Taylor's expansion of system (1) at equilibrium i ¼ i Ã up to the second order, we have, for v 2 V ,
with
Summing equations (14) over v, we have
This means that the convergence of hðtÞ towards zero is polynomial near equilibrium i Ã . This completes the proof of the first statement in Theorem 4.
If GÀB;1 > 0, we first consider the case that G is strongly connected and then extend the analysis to the case that G has an arbitrary topology.
In the case G is strongly connected, we observe that condition (a) of Theorem 4 is satisfied. Similar to the algebra used in the proof in Theorem 3, we can use induction to prove
when there exists v 2 V such that degðvÞ ! 2. When degðvÞ 1 for all v 2 V , it can be verified directly that f v ðdiÞ > df v ðiÞ still holds. Note that ½@f v ðiÞ=@i u u;v2V is irreducible and f v ðiÞ is strictly subhomogeneous for v 2 V and i ) j 0. By Theorem 4, we have lim t!1 iðtÞ ¼ i Ã for all initial values in ð0; 1 n , where i Ã ) j 0. In the case G is not strongly connected, G can be partitioned into some strongly connected components according to the Frobenius form (2) . This means that there are two cases: p ¼ 2 and p > 2.
When p ¼ 2, A, B and G have the following form:
where A 12 and G 12 are not zero matrices. For an arbitrary strongly connected component V 2 without in-edges, if V 2 is singlet, namely degðvÞ ¼ 1 for all v 2 V 2 , then it is trivial to prove that i v ðtÞ converges to some positive number i Ã v 2 ð0; 1Þ for all v 2 V 2 ; otherwise, following the same algebras above, under the conditions that degðvÞ ! 2 for some v 2 V 2 , one can also prove that i v ðtÞ converges to some positive number i Ã v 2 ð0; 1Þ for all v 2 V 2 . Then, we can rewrite Eq. (1) restricted on V 1 as follows
for v 2 V 1 . By assigning i v ðtÞ as i Ã v for each v 2 V 2 , Eq. (15) asymptotically becomes
for v 2 V 1 with
being a positive number less than 1. If G 11 ÀB 11 ;1 0, we already proved in the first case of the present theorem that subsystem (16) converges. If G 11 ÀB 11 ;1 > 0, since A 11 is a strongly connected component, we can also obtain that subsystem (16) converges by using the same method as for proving that i v ðtÞ converges to i Ã v for all v 2 V 1 . When p > 2, we can use induction on p to prove that i v ðtÞ converges to i Ã v for all v 2 V . The exponential convergence of the dynamics under the condition GÀB;1 > 0 can be proven similarly to the proof of the convergence speed in Theorem 3. In other words, except some zero-measure set ðb v ; g vu Þ v;u2V 2 v2V W b v Â u;v2V W g vu & ½0; 1 n 2 for u; v 2 V , the convergence for system (1) with GÀB;1 > 0 is exponential. This completes the proof of the second statement in Corollary 4.
t u
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 7
Proof. We rearrange the equations in system (1) and divide them into two subsystems 
where a v k > 0 for k 2 f1; . . . ; m À 1g and di vm ðtÞ dt ¼ Àb v m i v m ðtÞ þ 1 À Y 
Let V sub1 ¼ fv 1 ; . . . ; v mÀ1 g and V sub2 ¼ fv m ; . . . ; v n g. From Lemma 3, we can directly obtain that there exists a unique sub-equilibrium i Ã sub1 ¼ ½i Ã v 1 ; . . . ; i Ã v mÀ1 2 ½0; 1 mÀ1 nf j 0 mÀ1 ; 1 mÀ1 g such that every trajectory component i v k ðtÞ of subsystem (18) always converges to i Ã v k for all k 2 f1; . . . ; m À 1g.
By assigning i v k ðtÞ as i Ã v k for all k 2 f1; . . . ; m À 1g, subsystem (17) asymptotically becomes di v k ðtÞ dt
for k 2 fm; . . . ; ng. Let G sub2 ¼ ½g vu u;v2V sub2 and B sub2 ¼ diagfb v m ; . . . ; b v n g. According to Lemma 4, we know that when a v k ¼ 0 for k 2 fm; . . . ; ng, if G sub2 ÀB sub2 ;1 0, every trajectory component i v k ðtÞ of subsystem (18) always converges to 0 for all k 2 fm; . . . ; ng; if G sub2 ÀB sub2 ;1 > 0, there exists a unique sub-equilibrium i Ã sub2 ¼ ½i Ã vm ; . . . ; i Ã vn 2 ½0; 1 m nf j 0 nÀmþ1 ; 1 nÀmþ1 g such that every trajectory component i v k ðtÞ of subsystem (18) always converges to i Ã v k for all k 2 fm; . . . ; ng. Therefore, we conclude that there exists a unique equilibrium i Ã ¼ ½i Ã sub1 ; i Ã sub2 ¼ ½i Ã v 1 ; . . . ; i Ã v mÀ1 ; i Ã vm ; . . . ; i Ã vn 2 ½0; 1 n such that every trajectory iðtÞ ¼ ½i v 1 ðtÞ; . . . ; i vn ðtÞ of system (1) always converges to i Ã .
The convergence speed in all cases can be obtained immediately from Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. t u
APPENDIX E PROOF OF THEOREM 8
Proof. For each node v 2 V , consider the following derivatives:
di v ðtÞ dt
and di v ðtÞ dt
i v ðtÞ
where g v;max ¼ max u2V fg vu g and g v;min ¼ max u2V fg vu g. For any v 2 V , we observe the following: with i min and i max defined in (8) and (9) .
According to the Gronwall inequality [31] , we obtain i v ðtÞ i v ðtÞ i v ðtÞ where
for v 2 V and all t 2 ½0; þ1Þ. This completes the proof. t u
